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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MERLIN JACKSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

LOTHAIRE R. RICH,

Case No.
12602

Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Defendant-Appellant
Statement of Kind of Case
This is an action by plaintiff on an express contract
to recover for work and materials furnished on defendant's rental unit in a building owned by defendant in
Fillmore, Utah, which the plaintiff occupied as a
tenant, and a counterclaim by the defendant for unpaid
rent and damage to the premises.
Disposition in Lower Court
The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict against
the defendant on plaintiff's complaint in the sum of
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$1,229.00 was rendered, which was offset by the sum
of $490.00 in unpaid rent, with the net sum of $739.00

from which verdict the defendant appeals.

'

Relief Sought on Appeal
Reversal of the judgment against the defendant
in toto and the awarding of a judgment against the
plaintiff in the sum of $490.00 for unpaid rent, to be
offset by the sum of $179.18 for work done by the plaintilff, on other premi.ses, at defendant's request.

Statement of Facts
This concerns a rental contract between plaintiff
and defendant for the north half of a store at about
20 South Main Street in Fillmore, Utah. The plaintiff
approached the defendant about the middle or latter
part of October in 1968 ( T 173-29) and asked if the
store was for rent. The defendant told plaintiff that
the north half was for rent at $140.00 per month (T
173-9) Plaintiff stated that he was going to start a home
improvement business, and that he was well-qualified in
all phases of the building line ( T 173-20 & 21), that he in·
tended to put in electrical and plumbing appliances and
install them, and was financially able to ruri such a place
of business, and had already purchased supplies and
paid cash for them ( T 173-18 to 28)
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Subsequently it was agreed that the plaintiff would
rent the premises for the sum of $140.00 per month.
Since the premises were in need of repair and the plaintiff had represented himself to be well qualified to do
any and all repairs required, it was agreed that the
plaintiff would repair the building, and that defendant
would allow the plaintiff one half of the monthly rental,
or $70.00 per month, as credit for the work done on
the premises, said work done to be credited at the rate
of $3.50 per hour (Ex. P-1). The other half of the
rent, or $70.00 per month, was to be paid to the defendant in cash monthly by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was to have completed the repairs to
the building by December 1, 1968, during which time
plaintiff could occupy the premises without payment
of rent. Plaintiff subsequently was injured, so defendant extended the time for completion of the work until
January 1, 1969. Because of the injury of the plaintiff,
defendant authorized plaintiff's brother, William, to
also work on the premises and have this work credited
toward payment of the one half of the rent at the same
rate of $3.50 per hour, but no one else was ever authorized to work on the premises. It was also agreed that
defendant would allow the sum of wholesale cost plus
10 per cent for materials furnished. (Ex. P-1) The
time for completion of the work was again extended
to February 1, 1969. (See letter of Jan. 30, 1969, Ex.
P-2 and P-3) and plaintiff agreed to start paying the
monthly rental on February 1, 1969. (See plaintiff's
Answer to Counterclaim, para. 2, R 10) .
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Defendant authorized plaintiff to finish some work
on ~th.er p~emises (See letter of Jan. 7th, Ex. P-2).
Pla.mtiff did this work, and claimed $179.18 (Complamt, para. 6, R-2) , which defendant stipulated as
credit to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff actually had possession of the premises
from November 1, 1968, to l\Iay 16, 1969 (Ex. P-6)
(See defendant's Notice to Quit and Vacate served May
19, 1969. Ex. P-5)
Plaintiff never did pay the $70.00 cash per month
as was agreed, even though defendant made a demand
for the same in a letter of April 17, 1969. (Ex. P-4).
Plaintiff never offered to pay rent at any time (T 1813 and T 74 9 to 20) , either before or after notice to
vacate or pay rent (Ex. P-5). The defendant went to
Fillmore for the first time since January, 1969, about
J nne 5, 1969, and saw the condition of the building.
Defendant's letter of September 2, 1969, authorized
plaintiff to move all of the equipment out of the building
except the back partition, the sheet rock on the middle
partition, and the two sheets of plywood in the window.
Plaintiff moved out of the premises the 4th or 5th of
September, 1969 (T 184-22), and removed everything
from the premises, including the rugs in the windows,
except those items above mentioned.
The plaintiff sued to recowr for all of the work he
claims was done on the premises by himself and others,
plus the materials, at retail less 10% instead of whole·
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sale plus 10%, without any credit for the items which
were removed from the premises, even though, by plaintiff's own admission, there was never any agreement for
defendant to pay him cash for the work. ( T 94-20 to
24) Jury awarded the verdict to the plaintiff, from which
the defendant appeals.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PRIOR TO TRIAL ON THE
GROUND THAT THERE WAS NO JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.
The plaintiff in the complaint alleged an express
contract for the defendant to pay plaintiff $3.50 per
hour for services rendered.
In answer to Question No. 3 of defendant's Interrogatories, asking "Is it not also true that defendant
never agreed to pay you any money for work done on
the portion you were to occupy?" plaintiff answered:
"Defendant (obviously an error- should be plaintiff)
agreed to pay $140.00 a month with one half of the
rental costs to be credited upon the improvements made
by the plaintiff on the building he was renting." (Also
see R 22-25 to 27)
Thereby plaintiff admitted he was to take out the
cost of improvements by credit at $70.00 per month.
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The defendant made a motion to dismiss the pla'.
t~ff's complaint on the grounds that there was no jus~
c1able controversy, as the pleadings and facts show the
payment for work done on the rental unit was to be paid
by credit on the rent, which effectively refutes the
plaintiff's ~pecific allegation for payment (T 4-18 to

T 5-15)

At the time this motion was made there was nothing
in the record to indicate that the plaintiff was relying
on quantwn meruit as it hadn't been pleaded, and it was
agreed that plaintiff had not paid the rent, and the de·
fendant argued that a person in default had no standing
before the court, and at this point there was no contro·
versy. Also ( T 5-20-22) he who seeks equity must do
equity.
The plaintiff's attorney in his argument brought
forth the theory of quantum meruit, but admitted he
hadn't pleaded it. ( T 6-5 to 12) He never asked to
amend his complaint to include an alternative remedy
at that time, and stated that he could show damages on
specific agreement. (T 5-29, 30 and T 6-29 to T 7-9)
There was no pre-trial order in the file, although
the minutes (R-27) show that the order should have
been filed, and plaintiff's attorney had been ordered to
prepare it ( T 7-27 to T 8-u) It should also be pointed
out that there was no order in the file setting aside the
default of the plaintiff. (Pre-trial Order signed June
29, 1971, and Order setting aside default signed July
1, 1971 (R-29 and R-30.) Defendant submits that he
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was entitled to a dismissal based on the file and all the
facts, and it was error to proceed further. The motion
was taken under advisement, but never ruled on.
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE
EXPRESS CONTRACT, AS PLAINTIFF HAD
BREACHED THE CONTRACT AND HAD NO
RIGHT TO RECOVER UNDER THE LAW.
On the contract proven as pleaded, the plaintiff
was given three months to prepare the premises, then
to start paying the rent, $70.00 by credit on work done
at $3.50 per hour and materials furnished at wholesale
cost plus 10%, and $70.00 cash, commencing on February 1, 1969. The plaintiff breached the contract by
failure to complete the work agreed upon, even though
given three months free occupacy in which to complete
it. In addition to the work that was done, plaintiff was
supposed to have put in a restroom (T 47-14, 20), which
he never did. Plaintiff also breached the contract as he
never paid rent as agreed or even tendered or offered to
pay ( T 74-9 through 20) .
17 Am. J ur. 2d on Contracts, Sec. 355, page 791,
states:
An obligation to perform arises upon the making
of a binding contract, notwithstanding it is not ~o
be performed until a future date, and the !ule ~s
that for a party to rec~)Ver he must ~s~abhsh his
own performance, or his off ~r a~d ability to perform, or a valid excuse for his failure to perform.
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Cit.ed under the footnote, Nees v. Weaver, 222
Wis. 492, 107 A.L.R. 1405.
Performance in the true spirit and meaning of the
agreement is expected in the law. Also cited: Miller
v. Young, 1970 Okla. 503, 172 P.2d 994.
Performance by the obligee or excuse therefore is
essential to the right to recover upon the contract having
dependent covenants. Cites Western U. Tel. Co. v.
Yopst, 118 Ind. 248, 20 N.E. 222.

A failure on the part of one party to a contract to
comply with its terms destroys his right to enforce it

against the other or to derive any statutory rights there·
from. ' Sec. 358 of the same volume at 797 on necessity
of offer of performance:
The general rule is that where performance of an
agreement is to be concurrent on both sides,
neither can recover without showing performance
or an offer or tender of performance on his part.
and cites a number of cases in the footnote.
Sec. 365, page 807 of the same volume states:
As a rule a first party guilty olf a substanti~l ~r
material breach of contract cannot complam 1f
the other party thereafter refuses to perform. He
can neither insist on performance by the other
party nor maintain an action against the other
party for subsequent failure to perform.
In Vol. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 566:

Performance or Breach. A party seeking to en·
force performance of a contract or to recover for
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the breach thereof where the contract contains
mutual covenants must not only allege but prove
that he has performed his own part. ... Otherwise he must allege and prove legal excuse for his
non-performance .... In an action to recover for
a breach of contract plaintiff must allege and
prove his willingness to perform.
The footnote cites Roseleaf Corp. v. Radis, 264

P.2d 964.

Applying the above principles to the instant case,
the plaintiff never alleged that he had performed and
never proved it. He never alleged he paid or offered to
pay the rent, and he admitted that he never completed
the work to be done on the contract, and never offered
any excuse for failure to complete the work. He never
expressed a willingness to perform, and never offered
to complete the work or pay the rent and continue in
the premises. In fact, under the express contract proven
by him and all the law, he had never done anything
by which the law could let equity apply, in the form of
quantum meruit or other remedy, and allow him a recovery. The instant case clearly shows that the plaintiff
expected to get his payment for work done from the
$70.00 per month credit. (See plaintiff's Answer to Interrogatories R 22-19 to 24, also T 94-20 to 24 and
T 69-3 through 12). Any recovery would have to be in
direct conflict with the terms of the express contract.

POINT III. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT
HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO MEET THE
ISSUE OF QUANTUM MERUIT.
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The quantum meruit issue was discussed at pre.
trial, but the pretrial order was not signed by the Judge
until June 29, after the trial was started on the 28th, and
was not received by the defendant until 2 :45 p.m. on
Wednesday, June 30, after the selection of the jury
and the day before the trial was to proceed at 9 :00 a.m.
in Fillmore. The quantum meruit was discussed on June
28 prior to selection of the jury ( T 6-6 through 15) but
no attempt was made to amend the pleadings at any time
to include quantum meruit itself or as an alternative
remedy to the express contract.
As is well known, the parties have a right to meet
the issues, and in this instance, at the pre-trial, it was
ordered by the Judge that a pre-trial order be prepared
if the case wasn't settled by the 20th of May, and that
thereafter the case would be set for trial. However,
the case was set for trial on June 29, without a pre·
trial order having been submitted by plaintiff, giving
the defendant no opportunity to meet the issues.

Am. J ur. Vol. 41 on Pleading, Sec. 383, states
among other things:
There can be no recovery upon a cause of action
however meritorious it may be or how satisfac·
torily proved that is substance variant from that
which is made by the plaintiff unless an amend·
ment be made to conform the pleading to the
proof of the new cause of action.
The Utah court has held that it is necessary to properly
apprise the defendant of the quantum meruit claim. See
Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 264 P.2d 279, 1 Utah 2d
175.
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Action w~s ?rought to recover money allegedly
owed plamtiff by defendant for services performed by plaintiff as a manager for defendant.
The Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah
County, Joseph E. Nelson, J., entered judgment
for plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Co~t h:ld. ~hat it was error to charge defendant with habihty under quantum meruit an
issue which defendant was never called o~ to
meet.
There was no attempt in the instant case to amend
or conform the pleadings to the proof.
The submission to the jury was error on the above
ground.
POINT IV. THE SUBMISSION OF THE
CASE TO THE JURY ON A QUANTUM MERUIT BASIS WAS ERRONEOUS AS IT WAS
NEVER PLEADED BY PLAINTIFF.
The theory of quantum meruit was never pleaded
by the plaintiff ( T 6-5 to 13) and no amendment was
ever offered to conform the pleadings to the record
(see whole record.)
Numerous courts hold that where there has been
an express contract alleged, there can be no recovery
on a quantum meruit. In the instant case the plaintiff
alleges an express contract, stating it is both verbal
and in writing ( T 6-28 to 30) and all the evidence
(Ex. P-1 through P-6) clearly indicates such to be
the case. The evidence clearly establishes an agreement
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by the plaintiff to rent the premises for $140.00 per
month, and other terms as previously set forth. This is
clearly an express contract and was argued by plaintiff's counsel to be such.
In support of the theory that there can be no recovery on quantum meruit where an express contract
is pleaded, we quote from Vol. 17A C.J.S., Contracts,
Sec. 569, page 1095:
a. Allegation of Express, and Proof of Implied,
Contract. Generally, a plaintiff cannot, in an action brought on an express or special contract,
recover, or introduce evidence, on an implied contract or quantum meruit, unless, under some authorities, he amends his pleadings or fails to establish the express or special contract.
At page 1096 it states:
In an action brought on an express or special contract plaintiff cannot recover on proof of an implied contract or on quantum meruit.
This has a footnote with numerous cases cited from
the U. S. Court and twenty-four state courts, from
Arizona to Wisconsin.
In the same volume at 1099 it states:
Contract breached by plaintiff. In the absence of
an alternative plea on quantum meruit plaintiff
who declares on contract which is shown to have
been breached by him may not recover on quan·
tum meruit.
In Vol. 35A of Words and Phrases, page 413, it
sets forth, citing Wade v. Nelson, 95 S.W. 956, citing
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Hutson v. Tyler, 36 S.W. 654, McDonnell v. Stevenson, 77 S.W. 760:
In an action on an express contract alleged to
have been performed by the plaintiff there can
be no recovery on quantum meruit.
Also in Vol. 8, Pacific Digest 2d, Sec. 346 at page
660 on Declaring on an express contract and recovering
on quantum meruit, it cites a number of cases, some of
which are:
Arizona, Brown v. Beck, 202 P.2d 528, 68 Ariz.
139.
Where plaintiff testified that there was a written
contract on subject of his employment by defendant, but terms of contract were not established, plaintiff should not have been permitted
to recover value of services rendered by him to
defendant on quantum meruit theory.
Montana, Puetz v. Carlson, 364 P.2d 742, quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts Sec. 569.
Express contract must be proven as alleged and
failure to do so is not merely variance but failure
of proof, and recovery may not be had on proof
of implied contract.
Montana, Arrow Agency v. Anderson, 355 P.2d
929.
As a general rule, recovery cannot be had on
quantum meruit under complaint alleging express
contract.
New Mexico, Cavez v. Potter, 274 P.2d 308, 58
N.M. 662.
One cannot sue on express contract and recover
on quantum meruit. "There complaint was for
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J:>reach of express contract, alternative praver for
JUdgmen~ in quantum mer1;1it could not authorize
recovery rn quantum mermt.
Oklahoma, Oklahoma Natural G(UI Co. v. Her.
ren, 195 P.2d 278, 200 Oki. 480.
Where petition declares alone on express con.
tract to complete full performance thereof, no
recovery can be had on quantum meruit.
Oregon, Flaherty v. Bookhultz, 297 P.2d 856
207 Or. 462.
'
One cannot sue upon an express contract and re·
cover upon a quantum meruit, and to recover
upon a quantum meruit, it must be pleaded and
proved.
Utah, Morris v. Russell, 236 P.2d 451, 120 Utah

545.

Where both parties to an action to recover for
services rendered alleged same express contract,
it is improper to submit the case to jury on quan·
tum meruit.
Please note the above case is cited in 26 A.L.R.
2nd 947.
There are some courts that do allow recovery in
certain instances, but they are distinguishable from the
present case.
So it must be concluded that where a specific con·
tract is pleaded and proven, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff cannot recover on quantum meruit, and it was
error to submit it to the jury.
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POINT V. THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON
QUANTUM MERUIT AS THE EVIDENCE
·wAS NOT PREPONDERANT AS TO REASONABLE VALUE OF THE SERVICES.
Quantum meruit, which was introduced without
pleadings or amendments offered, we find being defined
in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. page 1408, as:
"As much as he deserved." The common count in
an action of assumption for work and labor founded on an implied assumption or promise on the
part of the defendant to pay the plaintiff as much
as he reasonably deserved to have for his labor.
This is supported and is replete with citations from
Vol. 35A of Words and Phra.ses, Quantum Meruit,
page 413, from which we cite Adams v. Smith, 307
S.W.2d 525, 527:
"Quantum meruit" means "as much as he has deserved"; and in action on quantum meruit burden
is on claimant to plead, prove and have jury instructed that his charges are fair and reasonable.
There was no showing in the present case that the
charges were fair and reasonable, but were based on
the specific contract. That the correct measure is the
benefit conferred on the defendant is shown in the same
volume and page, Bouterie v. Carre, La. App., 6 So.2d
218:
The amount recoverable on a "quantum meruit"
depends upon the extent of the benefit conferr.ed
having reference to the contract for the entire
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work, and this is usually the contract price /esi
the damages caused by not complying with the
exact terms of the contract. (Emphasis added)
Nearly all cases cite reasonable value as the amount
of recovery, but it must be the reasonable value to the
recipient, as in the case also cited on page 416 of 35A
Words and Phrases. It cites the above case further:
Where a party derives any benefit from services
rendered by another, the law reasonably implies
a promise to pay on the part of the one who has
received such benefit, such amount as it is reasonably worth, on the theory of "quantum mer·
uit." (Emphasis added)
Quantum meruit is based on the theory of unjust
enrichment, which Black's Law Dictionary, page 1705,
states under this:
Doctrine that a person shall not be allowed to
profit or enrich himself inequitably at another's
expense. American University v. Forbes, 88 N.H
17, 183 Atl. 860.
This is also shown in Vol. 35A of Words and Phra.ses,
page 417, under unjust enrichment, in Ylijarvi v.
Brockphaler, 7 N.W.2d 314, 319, 213 Minn. 385:
The basis of a recovery on a "quantum meruit" ~
that the defendant has received a benefit from the
plaintiff which it is unjust for defendant to re·
tain without paying for.
The test is how much the defendant has been enrichea
or benefited, and the mere doing of work for another
does not justify recovery, as is clearly shown on page
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417 of 35A Words and Phrases in Ylijarvi v. Brock-

phaler, supra:

~here a cont~act for the drilling of a well pro-

vided for a 4-mch casing and was not thereafter
modified, and c~n~ractor, after partial drilling of
~he well as specif i~d, substituted a 21/2-inch casmg and after. drillmg to a further depth, but before completmg the well ceased work and removed the 21/2-inch casing and the contractor's
equipment from the owner's premises and it was
not shown that the part performance was of any
benefit to the owner, it was not unjust for owner
to retain the work performed and materials furnished without paying for them, and contractor
could .not recover on a "quantum meruit" for contractor's part performance.

Applying this result to the present case, the defendant
should be able to take back the building without paying
plaintiff anything as there was no showing of the benefit to the defendant, but there was actual showing of
damage to defendaant instead of benefit.
On this point the Utah court in Y owng et ux. v.
Hansen et ux., 117 Utah 591, 218 P.2d 666, allowed a
plaintiff who had breached the contract to recover for
the amount they contributed to the defendants over and
above the amount of harm they caused the defendants
by their breach. However, in Young v. Hansen, supra,
the court left guidelines when it can be applied, among
other things, if the breach was not deliberate. Here the
breach was deliberate, as shown (T 309-4 to 15) when
plaintiff said he deliberately did not put in the restroom
or finish the back part.
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So, if we assume for the sake of argument that
this is a case for quantum meruit and apply the rule
of Young v. H amen to the instant case, by using the
testimony of the plaintiff's own expert witnesses, when
considered against the testimony as to damage cost
which were unref uted, we would find:
Plaintiff's witness-Vernon Peterson, expert (T. 114 to T. 1221
Original Estimate in First
Class Condition (T. 119-13 to 19)
$1,495.0ij
Minus half of sheetrock estimate
as he computed twice as much as
actually was done -$518.40 -Vz
(T. 117-20 to T. 118-16)
Minus $108.00 on floor as he
figured 2000 feet at 15c per foot,
and Jackson claimed only 60x20
feet, $288.00 total estimate
(T 118-18 to 29)

-$259.20
- 108.00
367.2ij

$1,127.80

Total with Deductions off
Jackson claimed two coats of paint,
475 yards at 75c per _yd. (T. 119-1
to 11) For extra coat (T. 119-1
to 11)

374.5!

$1,502.35

Total with two coats of paint

-

Add credit for work done on other
premises
Total credits
Minus the amount for work which
had to be redone. Jackson said he
left holes in north wall (T 102-4 to 12)
and sheet rock had to be
sanded off on all seams, on all
walls and ceiling scraped
(T. 294-27 to T. 295-2)._So.
all the work done on pamtmg was
of no benefit to defendant and
couldn't be charged
2 coats @ $374.55 each
Minus time spent in repairi~g work
done by Jackson so premises.
could be used damage deduct.ible
as can only recover for benefit
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179.li

$1,681.53

-$759.10

over and above harm done (T.
291 to T. 295)
Keith Cole, 17 hrs. @ $3.50
Sterling Rich, 6 hrs. @ $4.50
Lothaire R. Rich, 171/z hrs.
@ $3.50

$59.50
27.00
61.25

Minus rent @ $140.00 per mo. from
Nov. 1, 1968 to May 16, 1969, 61/z
mos. time shown in pleadings and
testimony-only recover on
amount above harm

- 147.75

910.00

Total to be Deducted

$1,816.85

Net owing defendant by plaintiff
after deduction for harm done
and items where defendant
received no benefit by this
witness

$ 135.32
Please note there was no breakdown shown from this witness
except as brought out on cross-examination.
Vernon Peterson testimony as applied to the particular situation
under the law, as set forth in Point V.
Plaintiff's witness-- Brooks Anderson, expert taken from testimony (T. 133 to T. 152) and breakdown as submitted by him on
Exhibit D-7.
$ 684.20
179.18
Plus credit for work on other premises
Total Credit
Deduction for cost of painting which
had to be redone, so was of no benefit
as estimate on Ex. D-7
(See Peterson sheet for full
explanation)
Less cost of repairing work done by
Jackson so could be used, see
breakdown on Peterson explanation
Less value of rent not received @
$140.00 per mo. from Nov. 1, 1968
to May 16, 1969-admitted by plaintiff
and shown in pleadings, 61h mos.

$ 863.38
$210.00

147.75

910.00
-$1,267.75

Total to be Deducted

Net owing defendant by plaintiff after
deducting for harm done and items
$ 404.37
on which he received no benefit
Brooks Anderson testimony as applied to the particular situation
under the law in Point V.

19

Note that neither testified that the work was well done
a.n~ tha.t there was no testimony by any of the plain.
tiffs witnesses who testified that the work was done
well, and that even the plaintiff himself admitted that
it was good enough for him, but wouldn't be gooa
enough for Mr. Warner's store.
Mr. Brooks Anderson had a complete breakdown
on the costs and figures for doing the whole job as tola
to him by Mr. Jackson, (T 136-6 to 14, T 138-18 to
21), but even though he had called Brooks Anderson
as a witness, the plaintiff refused to use the figures and
breakdown which Anderson had prepared, and it was
necessary for the defendant to introduce the estimate
as Exhibit D-7 (T 145-14 to 27). The total on this
was shown in the above figures as computed by the
adding machine tape, which tape is attached to the
exhibit but was not a part of the exhibit at the time,
as Mr. Anderson stated that he didn't add it as he
thought it could be added.

It should also be noted that Exhibit P-6 show1

three women and several men were used, none of which
were shown to have any experience or ability along this
line, and even the plaintiff himself admits that he was
not experienced at putting on sheetrock and perfatape.
The only direct evidence showing who could be used
to work on the premises showed only that plaintiff's
brother William could be used. Plaintiff testified that
he was authorized to use anyone when he was in de·
fendant's office in February (by defendant, and Jan.
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or :Feb. by plaintiff). Both were long after the contract was made and work had been started. All of th;;;
people used were paid the $3.50 per hour which defendant agreed to pay only Jackson or his brother
'
regardless of ability.
From the above it can be seen that there was no
benefit accrued to the defendant, as shown by the testimonies. Mr. Peterson never noticed the condition of the
premises after the work done by Mr. Jackson, to testify
whether it was a good or bad job, and Mr. Brooks
Anderson did note the condition of the premises, even
though tliere was a store in it and it had been repainted,
and he testified:
But I don't think he done the best job in the
world, and I told him that. (Referring to Mr.
Jackson.) (T. 142-6 to 8)
Mr. Frampton, the other expert witness called by
plaintiff, even though he testified he was asked to figure
the cost of doing the work in the unit by Mr. Jackson,
according to Mr. Jackson's own instructions, testified
that he didn't figure it or check it as to the quality, and
he didn't testify as to the quality of the workmanship.
The testimonies of Keith Cole and Sterling Rich both
show that the work was poorly done, and had to be
redone. This was testified to by the defendant also,
and Mr. Warner testified that the building was in poor
condition, and Mr. Jackson himself testified that he
left holes in the wall that had to be spackled, and of
course spackling would require another paint job.
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After all of the testimony by most of the witnesse~
saying that the work was poorly done, the plaintiff and
his counsel changed tactics and began contending that
while the work would not stand critical inspection for
other people, and maybe not for a furniture store, put
in by Mr. Warner, it was good enough for l\fr. Jackson.
(T 308-17 to 24 and T 314-7 to 15)
Plaintiff argued that he was building for himself
and not for someone else. This was a store, and to be
of benefit to defendant, it should have been built so
that others could occupy it when l\fr. Jackson left it,
as was necessary here. The jurors, who were all friends
or acquaintances of plaintiff's counsel, were obviously
convinced that it was not necessary to build it for use
by others.
This clearly indicates thinking diametrically op·
posed to the law, which requires defendant to pay for
only the benefit received by him, so if it isn't fixed good
enough so that it will benefit defendant in his rentals
when the building is left vacant, then obviously de·
fondant should not be required to pay anything. To do
otherwise would not be equitable.
All of the plaintiff's evidence was for the purpose
of showing the time and materials he had put in, not
at any time showing what it would be worth to the
defendant. The plaintiff testified as to the total cost
he was billing, but he at no time testified as to the worth
of the items that were taken out, such as the partition
across the middle, plus a counter across the middle, also
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the long counter on the north side, and the stand for
the wash basins. These are shown in defendant's exhibits
D-2 and D-5.
In fact, when questioned on cross-examination, Mr.
Jackson specifically stated that he did not keep track
of the amount of time or materials he had put in on any
of the particular items, and he would have no way of
knowing what they would be worth.
Further, the defendant pointed out that the total
hours claimed by plaintiff for Ex. P-6 totaled 3121/2
hours, and did not check with the actual figures as
. checked, but no attempt was made to correct the same.
The only situation where the price of the item taken out
was known was where Jackson admittedly took out the
carpeting, which cost $47.00 by his testimony, but in
presenting this to the jury, there was no deduction made
from the total billing.
Except for a charge from the invoices of $58.00
which should have been $.58, there was no attempt in
the discrepancies to make any allowance for the mistakes made on the figures (T 241-27 to T 242-4 and
T 244-9 to 13) or for the property taken out of the
premises, as shown in the invoices and the testimony.
So it would be impossible from the evidence presented to arrive at the net benefit to the defendant, and
to submit this to the jury was error.
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POINT VI. THAT THE JURY'S VERDICT
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVI.
DENCE.
There was not evidence in any manner preponderant
which would support the verdict on a quantum meruit
basis. In addition to the matters set forth in Point V
and which is all incorporated herein as a part of Point
VI as if fully set forth herein, we point out that plain.
tiff's testimony was contradictory, ambiguous, evasive,
and deliberately misleading.
I

Plaintiff testified that he was doing work for other
people at this time (T 237-21 to 26 and T 236-12 to
15) and that he paid sales tax for materials which he
was going to use in the defendant's building, but for
other people he charged the sales tax when he sold it.
Among those invoices charged to defendant there were
two classse of bills, namely one with sales tax and one
without, which were marked for resale. In his general
testimony he stated that he wasn't charged sales tax
on those items which were for resale, but when they
were to be used by himself there was a tax charged. If
all of the materials invoiced and charged to the defendant
were in fact used in defendant's premises, there would
have been no need to differentiate in the billing.
Plaintiff testified that part of the materials were
used on other premises besides the rental unit ( T 238·
15 to 19, T 238-25 and 26, T 239-14 to 16, T 246-19
to 23, and T 247-21 and 22) . However, in his final
testimony he stated that all of the materials on the
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invoices listed and charged to defendant were put into
the rental unit, regardless of whether or not they were
marked for resale ( T 272-17 to T 273-3, and T 308-11
to 16), which is clearly contradictory.
POINT VII. THAT THE COURT ERRED

IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY, AS
SET FORTH IN THE FOLLOWING IN-

STANCES.

A. On, Instruction No. 15, the court erred in para-

graph 2 of the instruction, in that the court instructed:
If you should further find that plaintiff provided
labor and materials in remodeling and renovating
defendant's business in an amount equal to or in
excess of the rent required, then you may find
that the plaintiff was not in default and would be
entitled to require the performance of the def endant under the terms of the agreement.
This leaves a direct inference that no matter what the
plaintiff had done, he would be entitled to recover the
amount of work and labor performed which was in
excess of the $70.00 cash due for rent, due on the first
of February, and that he would not be in default.
Actually, even if this were true, under the law as applied in quantum meruit, the court should have pointed
out that he had occupied the premises from Nov. 1,
1968 , and so would have had to show that there had
been work done in excess of the value of three months'
rent, or $420.00, plus the $70.00, for a total of $490.00
as the total harm done to the defendant from his occu-
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pancy. In truth and in fact, plaintiff's time Exhibit
P-6 shows that up to February I, 1969, there were onlr
IOI hours put in, or $353.00, and plaintiff's Exhibit
P-7 for materials does not show any dates on the charges,
and therefore, under any theory, plaintiff would have
to be in defa ult, contrary to the instruction.
This is in direct conflict with the express agreement
pleaded and proven by plaintiff.
Under this in.struction, it would have allowed the
plaintiff to stay in the premises without paying any
cash on the rent, until all that he claimed was used up
in rent, and he could then move out and the defendant
landlord would get nothing for the time it was occupied.
This also does not take into consideration the fact
of the plaintiff's breach of contract, and duty to perform
before he can demand payment for any of the work
done, or to give a reasonable excuse or be willing to
complete performance. Instead, by his own admission,
he deliberately did not complete the contract (T 309·4
to 15)
If the law as instructed in this paragraph were
followed, then landlords would in effect have to guar·
antee the success of any tenant in business who had made
any improvements, whether made with or without an
agreement, as every improvement made would entitle
the tenant to an offset regardless of whether or not he
paid rent. This was error.
B. Instruction No. 16 states that the plaintiff
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should be awarded such damage as will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for money and damages sustained as a result of labor and materials furnished. This instruction is in error and contrary to law,
as the test is not whether or not it will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff when he is relying
on the application of quantum meruit, as was allowed
here, but the true test is the reasonable value to the
defendant for the work performed and materials furnished, over and above the harm or damage done to the
defendant. This is clearly set forth in Point No. V, and
it is supported and set out in Young v. Hansen, supra.
Here it was held that plaintiffs could recover a judgment for the amount they contributed to the defendants
over and above the amount of harm done defendants
by their breach. The case previously cited in Point V,
Ylijarvi v. Brockphaler, supra, also emphasises this fact.
In the instant case, there was no showing as to the
benefit over and above the amount of harm, and in truth
and in fact the only proof was as to the actual amounts
claimed for work and materials, and not the reasonable
worth or benefit over and above the amount of damage.
On quantum meruit, there should have been an
allowance for all the rental time that the plaintiff occupied or had his equipment and inventory in the premises,
namely from November 1, 1968, to September 2, 1969,
at $140.00 per month, as an offset, as this would be the
amount of rent .due for the time the plaintiff occupied
or held up the use of the premises. Inasmuch as the
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plaintiff had only pleaded express contract, the defend.
ant's pleadings only set out the actual amount of the
rent from when it was agreed that it would start, but
based on the detriment as quoted in Young v. Hansen,
previously cited, to the defendant, any recovery for the
plaintiff would have to be over and above that amount.
This also does not take into consideration the damage
done and time spent in fixing the building, which was
shown as $147.75 plus the cost of the painting, $210.00.
This is shown to be the law under Point No. V, and the
amounts shown on the information as set forth for
Brooks Anderson and Vernon Peterson, plaintiff's expert witnesses.
C. In regard to Instruction No. 17, this was in error
for the same reasons as set forth regarding Instruction
No. 16, as the $490.00 claimed for unpaid rent was the
express contract agreed price, but was not based on the
quantum meruit as allowed in this particular suit. When
quantum meruit applies, defendant is entitled to set off
all of the damages against any claim of the plaintiff,
as shown in Point No. V. To give this instruction was
error.
D. Ref erring to Instruction No. 20, this instruction
was erroneous in that the instruction combined the ex·
press and implied agreement together, while, if the
implied agreement had been left out, and the plaintiff
had relied on the express contract, he would have been
entitled to recover the agreed price if he hadn't defaulted
(as he did default he could not recover), under the law
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1

for the value of the work done over and above the detriment suffered by the defendant. See the previous points
covering this same postulate.

E. The court erred with respect to Instruction No.
22, as the second paragraph in the instruction is completely contrary to law and negates the first paragraph,
which first paragraph was based on the express contract.
If express contract was found, the first paragraph
would cover it without the second paragraph. However, the second paragraph states that if improvements
were placed in the building, that plaintiff is entitled
to reimbursement, which is not in fact at all true, as
he' must show performance of his contract, reasonable
excuse for failure to perform, or willingness to perform,
and/ or a tender of performance, before there can be
recovery by the plaintiff. This is clearly set forth in the
argument in Point No. II.
~'. The court erred in failing to give defendant's

requested Instruction No. 2. Title 78, Chapter 36, Sec.
3 of the 1953 Utah Code Annotated, as amended, gives
a landlord the legal right to dispossess the tenant on
a three-day notice to vacate or pay the rent when the
tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent. The plaintiff assumed this risk when he went into the premises
and didn't request a lease or any special provision for
recovery for work if bis tenancy was terminated. This
was in spite of the fact that defendant offered to give
plaintiff a lease (Ex. P-3) .
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G. The court erred in failing to gh·e defendant';
requested Instruction X o. 6. This instruction was baste
on the premise that a defaulting party cannot recore
where he has made no tender of performance, and t
amply set forth under the citations under Point IJ
and is complete and proper in all respects, and shoulc
ha n been gi•en.

H. In failing to gi'e defendant's requested Instrut·
tion X o. 12, the court erred. This should ha'e beet

gi>en as there was endence clearly showing that thi
work was poorly done, and had to be modified or redont
because of the ,,·orkmanship, and this could be useil
as an offset to reduce the benefit to the defendant, ani
all of the cases and authorities cited under Point Y su~
port the fact that the defendant can otfset any and ali
damages or detriments which he incurs against an;
claim which is made under quantum meruit, to makt'
the amount of reconry by the plaintiff, if any, reason·1
able.

POIXT YIII. TH_.\T THE COl__LlT ERRED
IX F~.\.ILIXG TO AD)IIT DEFEXD_-L.,T'S Of.,
FER OF EXHIBITS.
That during the course of the trial, plaintiff's at·
torney repeatedly referred to exhibits and letters written
bv the defendant cross examined defendant on them.
a~d quoted from. them, attempting to show bad faiili
on the part of the defendant for failing to object to
the condition of the premises. eYen though defendant
testified that he hadn't seen the pn-iperty from Janua0·
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until June of 1969, by taking excerpts out of context
to try and impeach the defendant's testimony, where
the whole letter as written would have explained the
whole situation. But the defendant was not permitted
to introduce the exhibits as offered, although plaintiff
identified them and could have testified as to any misstatement he thought they contained.
This was particularly true with the letter as to the
time of objection to the work done, and would have
shown that the defendant had not inspected the premises and couldn't have objected prior to the time he did
object. The letter regarding the permission to remove
the materials from the premises, which was quoted from
by the plaintiff, would have explained the general situation, but defendant was not allowed to introduce them.
The exhibits not admitted were designated D-12, D-13,
D-14, D-15, and D-16 (T 270-30 to T 271-1 to 5).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The defendant concludes that each and every point
as set forth herein is sufficient in and of itself to set
aside the verdict as rendered. The record and transcript
reveal that the trial was in error from commencement
to conclusion in numerous respects.
The plaintiff has invoked quantum meruit, or "as
much as he deserves." Let us see what he deserves.
He entered into an express rental contract, which
he never honored by payment of any money.
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He agreed to repair and improve the premises
which he partially carried out, the balance of which b;
deliberately ref used to complete.
The work he did was poorly done and to a large
measure had to be redone.
He had possession of the premises from November
1, 1968, to May 16, 1969, without an offer to pay, or
any excuse for his refusal, without alleging that he had
performed or had been prevented from performing, or
without being willing to perform.
He received from the work he had performed the
movable improvements without crediting the defendant
for anything which he had received.
So the question is what he deserves. The answer
must clearly be that he deserves to have his verdict set
aside and be required to pay the defendant the $490.00
rent due on the express contract less the $179.18 for
work on other premises which plaintiff performed, as
the defendant counterclaimed on the express contract
and could not recover as defendant deserves on quan·
tum meruit, and in addition to pay all costs of this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
LOTHAIRE R. RICH
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
2815 East 3365 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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